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Cache Coherence Protocol verification using
Ωmega
Ahn, Ki Yung
Portland State University, Portland OR 97207, USA
Computer Science Technical Report #TR-08-02
Abstract. We verify some correctness properties of the DASH cache
coherence protocol using Ωmega. Ωmega is a language with a rich type
system featuring GADTs, type functions, and user-guided type checking
rules. Cache coherence protocols have both safety properties and liveness
properties. We show how to describe some of the safety properties of
DASH cache coherence protocol in Ωmega. Since liveness properties are
not easily expressed by types, we investigate invariants sufficient to imply
some of the liveness properties of concern, and assert those invariants as
well in the type system of Ωmega. Using Ωmega, we can have both a
working program and an automatically checked proof of its properties
because Ωmega is both a programming language and a logic. Tightly
coupled programs and their properties using types guides us both in
the construction of the program and in strategies for modification that
preserves the essential properties.
This technical report is based on the paper submitted to the 2007 Spring Re-
search Proficiency Examination of Computer Science Department at Portland
State University. The Research Proficiency Examination is a part of the Ph.D.
candidacy examination process, which includes an oral presentation and a writ-
ten paper. I give thanks to my advisor Tim Sheard and my Research Proficiency
Examination Committee members: Tom Shrimpton, Andrew Black, Nirupama
Bulusu, James G. Hook, and Leonard Shapiro.
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31 Introduction
1.1 Overview
We have two goals in mind in this work. First, to investigate how to formalize
and verify correctness properties of cache coherence protocols in a dependently
typed language like Ωmega [She04]. Second, to examine the strength of Ωmega
on a real world example. We seek useful patterns for programming in Ωmega
and possible improvements to the Ωmega system.
There is a strong need for verifying correctness for distributed algorithms,
including cache coherence protocols. The behaviors of distributed systems are
much harder to reason about than the behaviors of sequential systems, because
distributed systems have larger state space and more intermediate paths be-
tween states due to parallelism, or non-determinism. To verify the correctness
of the system, we either test exhaustively over all possible states, which is the
strategy of model checking, or formally prove the correctness by logic, which is
the strategy of theorem proving. Our approach is the latter.
Proofs in theorem proving approach are scalable since they are independent over
the size of the system. Model checking has been an effective method for system
verification, but it can only verify systems of limited size. The model checking
approach are not generally scalable as the number of nodes increases, unless we
either use a hybrid approach of abstract interpretation that statically abstracts
the system behavior, or devise a clever way to reduce the state space. Because of
the limitations on scalability of model checking, the state space reduction is an
important issue [ID93]. Verifying coherency for shared memory systems by ex-
haustively validating their execution path is, in general, NP-Complete [CLS03].
Cache coherence protocols ensures that every read obtains the most recent
update1 in muliprocessor systems. Cache coherence protocols prevent cache co-
herence problems, which may occur when there are two differrent cache contents
for the same memory location [HP06]. A typical approach is to distinguish be-
tween shared cache (read only) and exclusive cache (write allowed) rights. The
DASH system is a distributed shared memory systems with a directory based
cache coherence protocol.
Although DASH [LLG+92] is a well studied system, we have not yet found for-
malizations of the system outside the model checking community. We formalize
the operational semantics of a simplified version of DASH cache coherence proto-
col described in Lenoski et al. [LLG+90]. We built a Haskell simulator following
this semantics as a proof of concept. Starting from the Haskell implementation
as a reference, we rewrite the program in Ωmega, enriching it with proofs of
some correctness properties exploiting the type system of Ωmega. We have de-
vised reflective data structures to enforce safety properties of the protocol. We
are investigating some invariants of liveness properties.
1 The meaning of ‘most recent’ may differ between memory consistency models.
4We are studying cache coherence protocols because we want to apply Ωmega
to a realistic problem. The duality of Ωmega, both a programming language
and a logic, allows us to have both proofs of the protocol properties and an
implementation of the protocol. Ωmega has shown its ability to prove inter-
esting properties of basic elements of programming such as natural numbers,
data structures (e.g. lists and trees), and small languages. In this work, we use
Ωmega to prove properties of a system containing several of those elements.
Since Ωmega is a programming language, we can also implement the system in
Ωmega. Having programs with automatically checked proofs by the type sys-
tem helps ensure correctness both for the first time development and for future
changes. In fact, the proof and the implementation are tied together. We prove
properties in Ωmega by finding an implementation that matches the type sig-
natures that describe the program properties. Cache coherence protocols are an
interesting problem of a reasonably challenging complexity. Therefore, we have
chosen the DASH cache coherence protocol for the case study.
We believe Ωmega has some merits compared to typical formal verification
tools like theorem provers or model checkers. Ωmega has a lower barrier of entry
for programmers without intensive training in logic, because the type system of
Ωmega embraces the specifications and proofs of program properties. Program-
mers are more comfortable programming with types than dealing directly with
logic. The duality of Ωmega, both a programming language and a logic, is based
on the Curry-Howard correspondence [How80]: a program p that has type t also
means that p is a proof for the proposition t. Having programs with automat-
ically checked proofs by the type system helps ensure correctness both for the
first time development and for future changes. Ωmega programs are correct by
construction, obeying the properties specified in their types, because we prove
the properties as we write the programs. In other words, we derive programs as
proofs for the specifications described in their types. This relates closely to Dijk-
stra’s vision of deriving correct programs during program construction [Dij68].
1.2 DASH is Like a Library System
DASH is a distributed shared memory system with directory based cache coher-
ence protocol. A directory is one of its key components. Directories keep records
of cached out memory pages. A local memory page may be cached by either the
local processor, or other remote processors, or both. Marking a directory in the
node when it grants a cache rights to its memory is like keeping a record in the
library when a book is checked out.
In Portland, a dozen or more collaborating libraries share their collections, so
that users may check out a book from any local library. Each individual library in
Portland is analogous to a processing node in the DASH system. A local library
should get a book from another remote library before a user checks out the book
from the local library. Similarly, a processing node in the DASH system caches
a memory page before a processor in the node refers to the memory content in
the local cache.
5Libraries can serve the community better with a correct and clever book sharing
protocol. Most books return to the home library after being lent out to another
library. But for some popular books, an interesting situation may arise. What
if a copy of a recent bestseller belonging to the Central Library is requested by
the North Portland Library while it is currently checked out by a user of the
Gresham Library? It is better to tell the Gresham Library to send the book
directly to North Portland Library than to have it returned back to the Central
Library from Gresham Library and then send it out to North Portland Library.
What happens in an efficient library system is almost exactly like what happens
in the DASH system. The only fundamental difference between a library system
and DASH is that memory is much easier to replicate than making copies of a
book. Memory pages can be cached out to several different nodes as a shared
read, while books in libraries can only be exclusively lent out. Because of this
property of memory, even more interesting things can happen in the DASH
protocol than in the library protocol.
1.3 Properties of the DASH Cache Coherence Protocol
The DASH cache coherence protocol has safety properties which must hold
all the time and liveness properties which should eventually hold. Distributed
systems, in general, have both kinds of these properties [Lyn96].
1.3.1. Safety Properties.
Safety properties are naturally captured by the type system. We can view a
type as a simple safety property. When a variable c has type Char, the value of
c is always some character, throughout the program execution, regardless of the
program input or the program execution path.
Directories have safety properties. A Directory can have at most one exclusive
record. When a directory has an exclusive record, it cannot have shared records.
A node cannot give exclusive cache rights of a memory page to two different
nodes at the same time, just as a library cannot lend out the same book twice
before it is returned. Exclusive record and shared record cannot coexist in a
directory; When a certain memory page is exclusively cached, other nodes must
have no shared cache rights to that memory page; Otherwise cache coherency
breaks down when the node with exclusive cache rights updates the memory
content.
1.3.2. Liveness Properties.
Our approach is to ensure liveness properties by asserting invariants that are
sufficient to imply the liveness properties of our concern. Invariants are properties
that are true of all reachable states of a system [Lyn96]. Invariant assertion is a
classical method for proving correctness [Flo67][Hoa69]. The strategy of invariant
assertion is claiming that if some properties (invariants) holds all the time then
6some other properties (liveness properties) will eventually hold. For example, we
can prove the correctness of the insertion sort algorithm based on the invariant
that the partial sequence created by insertion is always sorted.
Invariants for Request Completion. A request message always invokes either an
acknowledgement or a negative acknowledgement, and may invoke some other
additional messages. The acknowledgement message invoked by the request mes-
sage completes the request. The negative acknowledgement message invoked by
the request message reinvokes the request message when it is returned the re-
quester. As a result, we observe an invariant. When there is a pending request,
the communication channel of the system contains one or more of the following:
the request message, an acknowledgement, or a negative acknowledgement.
Progress and Fair Scheduling. Proving liveness properties of an asynchronous
system with invariant assertion requires certain assumptions. Those assump-
tions are progress and fair scheduling. Progress means that the system must
continually make steps. Otherwise, the requests will never complete regardless
of the invariants. In programming languages, we have a classical method for
proving progress that preserves invariants, called subject reduction. We are try-
ing to prove subject reduction of the protocol with the help of the Ωmega type
system (Section 4.2). We also need fair scheduling to prevent starvation of any
request. However, we do not aim to prove fair scheduling, since scheduling is, in
general, orthogonal to the design and implementation of protocols.
72 Operational Semantics
We define an operational semantics of a simplified version the DASH cache coher-
ence protocol. This is our original work solely based on Lenoski et al. [LLG+92].
The DASH system is a fairly complex distributed shared memory system with
multiple processing nodes. Each processing node in DASH has its own proces-
sors and memory. We simplify the DASH system in three ways. First, we only
consider the cache coherence control structures for one memory page per node.
Second, we simplify the communication by using a single bus, a reliable FIFO
communication channel. Third, nodes in our model process messages atomically,
blocking other node’s communication while one node is processing a message.
The first is a natural simplification to focus on the essence of the protocol. The
second and the third simplification makes the protocol behave less parallel. We
simplify the DASH cache coherence protocol to start with a problem of manage-
able complexity.
2.1 Notation
τ ∈ State = {In,Sh,Ex} i, j, k, s ∈ [N ] = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}
b,m ∈Msg ::=
i→j
Ask t τ k
∣∣∣ i→jAck t τ k s ∣∣∣ i→jNakt τ k ∣∣∣ i→jWrbt τ k
Msg⊥ = Msg ∪ {⊥} bs ∈ Bus = Msg∗
(N , bs) ∈World = ([N] fin−→ Node)×Bus
Nn = N (n) ∈ Node = Dir ×RAC × Prgn
D ∈ Dir = [N] fin−→ State ∼= StateN
(C,P ) ∈ RAC = Dir × PMS
PMS = [N] fin−→Msg⊥ ∼= (Msg⊥)N
ms ∈ Prgn =
{
n→j
Ask t τ k
∣∣∣ n→jAsk t τ k ∈Msg, τ ∈ {Sh,Ex}, t is unique}∗
Natural Numbers. [N ] is a set of natural numbers less than N , which is the
number of the nodes in a World. We use the symbols i,j,k node index and s for
pending invalidation counter, which are elements of [N ].
Memory State. State is the set of three possible cache states: In (invalid or
uncached), Sh (shared), and Ex (exclusive or dirty). We use the symbol τ for an
element of State.
8Message. Msg is the set of messages. There are four types of messages: Ask
(request), Ack (acknowledgement), Nak (negative-acknowledgement) and Wrb
(writeback) messages. Msg⊥ is a set of messages augmented by bottom (⊥),
which means empty slot for a message.
– An Ask message
i→j
Ask t τ k from i asks j for the cache access right τ (In,
Sh, or Ex) to memory k with message id t. Each Ask message fetched from
the programs of the nodes has a unique message id, and this message id
is incorporated into all subsequent messages caused by that original Ask
message.
– An Ack message
i→j
Ack t τ k s is a positive reply to an Ask message with
message id t, coming from i, granting j the cache access right τ to memory
k, where s is pending invalidation counter when τ is exclusive (Ex).
– A Nak message
i→j
Nakt τ k from i is a negative reply to the ask message with
message id t, refusing j the cache access right τ to memory k.
– A Wrb message
i→j
Wrbt τ k with message id t from i to j generated by the
ask message t forwarded from k, notifies that i has cache access right τ to
j’s memory after sending this writeback message. Wrb messages may occurs
when an Ask message forwards to a node that holds exclusive cache rights
to memory k.
World. A World is a model of the DASH system. We use the notation (N , bs) as
an element of the World. A World is a pair of N , a list of N nodes, and the bus
bs, the reliable FIFO communication channel possibly containing zero or more
messages. We refer to the nth node as either N (n) or Nn.
Node. A Node is a triple of a directory, a remote access cache, and a program.
We use the notation (D, rac,ms) to represent the node as a triple. Since rac is
a pair, we more often write (D, (C,P ),ms) to denote a node.
Directory. The directory structure represents the node’s view of who owns what
rights to its own memory. We use the symbol D to denote a directory. We use
notation D(k) to denote kth element of D.
Remote Access Cache. RAC is a pair of the node’s current cache rights and
pending requests for each cache entry. We use the notation (C,P ) to describe
RAC. For the cache entry for memory k, C(k) is the cache state and P (k) is a
possibly empty pending message slot.
The cache state list C is structurally identical to a directory, but describes
different information. It describes which kind of access rights the node has to
other nodes’ memory. The directory and the cache lists separate the memory
space orthogonally, like the rows and columns in matrixes. The cache list entry
C(j) of the ith node corresponds to the directory entry D(i) of the jth node.
The node records a request message from memory k in the the pending
message slot P (k) when it makes a request. The node can only send a cache
request when the corresponding entry of the pending message list is empty.
9Program. The program Prgn for node Nn is a list of Ask messages, which is an
abstraction of the activity that the node Nn will produce when it executes. The
program can only contain shared requests and exclusive requests. The message
id of each message in the program is unique throughout the World comprising
the DASH system.
Updates on Mappings. We have several structures that map [N ] to some set of
objects. Directories, cache state lists in a RAC, and node lists in a World are
such structures. The notation D[k 7→ v] denotes the mapping that acts like D
except for k, which maps to v. That is,
D[k 7→ v](x) =
{
D(x) when x 6= k
v when x = k.
2.2 Overview of the Protocol
We briefly describe the protocol by stating what kind of reaction each type of
message causes.
– On receiving
i→j
Ask t τ k message, the receiving node j may grant the request
by sending out an Ack or refuse the request by sending out a Nak. The node
j may forward the message or send a writeback message to k if needed.
– On receiving
i→j
Ack t τ k s message, the node completes the request by up-
dating the RAC, only if the message is still pending in the RAC. The Ack
message is ignored when there is no corresponding pending message in the
RAC. The node updates C(k), its cache rights to memory k, to τ and clears
the k’th pending message slot P (k), which contains the corresponding pend-
ing message (e.g.
j→i
Ask t τ k). For exclusive acknowledgements, the node may
invoke additional invalidation requests depending on the value s.
– On receiving
i→j
Nakt τ k message, node j will resend the Ask message t if the
message is still pending in the RAC. Otherwise the Nak message is ignored.
– On receiving
i→j
Wrbt τ k, node j will update its directory entry, and may
generate a forwarding Ack message in case of an invalidating writeback.
The DASH cache coherence protocol performs two way acknowledgement for
forwarded exclusive requests. These forwarded exclusive requests generate
invalidation writebacks.
We describe the protocol in detail, in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
2.3 Communication Rules
Communication rules describe how the World makes legal transitions. We write
(N , bs)→ (N ′, bs′) when there is a transition step from World (N , bs) to World
(N ′, bs′) by one of the rules recvMsg, sendMsg, or grntMsg. We call theses
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rules communication rules since they capture the behaviors of the nodes sending
and receiving messages on the bus. The communication rules depend on the
reaction rules of the form Nn, bs |= b ⇓ N ′n, bs′, which defines the behavior of
the node when it receives message b, possibly changing the bus configuration bs
to bs′ as well as the state of the node Nn to N ′n. We will describe the reaction
rules in detail, in Section 2.4.
N (n), bs |= b ⇓ N ′n, bs′
(N , b : bs)→ (N [n 7→ N ′n], bs′)
recvMsg
The recvMsg rule can fire on the World (N , b : bs), which has at least one
message on the bus, and one of its nodes N (n) can receive the first message b
to react according to one of the reaction rules. The resulting World after the
transition step is the same as the original World except for the changes from the
reaction.
N (n) = (D, (C,P ),
n→j
Ask t τ k : ms) C(k) 6= τ P (k) = ⊥
(N , bs)→ (N [n 7→ (D, (C,P [k 7→
n→j
Ask t τ k]),ms)], bs :
n→j
Ask t τ k)
sendMsg
N (n) = (D, (C,P ),
n→j
Ask t τ k : ms) C(k) = τ P (k) = ⊥
(N , bs)→ (N [n 7→ (D, (C,P ),ms)], bs) grntMsg
Either the sendMsg rule or the grntMsg rule can fire on the World (N , bs)
when one of its nodes can fetch the next request from its program and send it
on the bus. A node can only fetch the next request, if it is the first message of
the program and there are no conflicting pending requests asking the cache for
the same target address. The grntMsg rule may fire when the node already has
the cache right τ to the memory k, which meets the request
n→j
Ask t τ k. Since
the node already has the cache right τ for the new request, there is no need to
make a redundant request. Otherwise, when the node does not have the cache
right τ for the new request, the sendMsg rule may fire.
2.4 Reaction Rules
Reaction rules describe how a node reacts to the message input. We write
Nn, bs |= m ⇓ N ′n, bs′, when node Nn can receive message m and update its
state from Nn to N ′n and change the bus configuration from bs to bs
′, The node
Nn can only receive messages whose destination is n, such as
i→n
Ask t τ k. When
the node receives a message, it changes its state by updating the directory D
and the RAC of the from (C,P ) and replies to the input message by sending
new messages on the bus.
11
We use the context notation on the node to emphasize the changing parts of
the node in the reaction rules. The formula Nn[C], bs |= m ⇓ Nn[C ′], bs′ denotes
that the reaction only updates the cache of the node. That is, the state of
the node changes from (D, (C,P ),ms) to (D, (C ′, P ),ms).Similarly, the formula
Nn[D][P ], bs |= m ⇓ Nn[D′][P ′], bs′, with two contexts, denotes that the reaction
updates both the directory and the pending message list of the node. That is,
the state of the node changes from (D, (C,P ),ms) to (D′, (C,P ′),ms).
2.4.1. Ask Rules (handling requests).
Invalidation Request. Invalidation requests succeed unless the node receiving the
request has exclusive rights to the requested memory.
C(k) 6= Ex
Nn[C], bs |=
i→n
Ask t In k ⇓ Nn[C[k 7→ In]], bs :
n→i
Ack t In k 0
askInAck
C(k) = Ex
Nn[C], bs |=
i→n
Ask t In k ⇓ Nn[C], bs :
n→i
Nak t In k
askInNak
Shared Requests and Exclusive Requests. Shared Requests and Exclusive Re-
quests share common traits. Some of the rules are exactly the same for both kinds
of requests: The rules askNotInNakP and askNotInNakF that cause Naks,
and the rule askNotInFwd which forwards the requests apply to both shared
and exclusive requests. Other rules have counterparts sharing similar structure:
the rules askShAckF and askExAckF are paired, and the rules askShRetry and
askExRetry are paired. The only significant difference between handling shared
requests and exclusive requests are in the rules askShAck and askExAck.
τ 6= In msgid(P (k)) 6= t
Nn[P ], bs |=
i→n
Ask t τ k ⇓ Nn[P ], bs :
n→i
Nak t τ k
askNotInNakP
The request fails when the receiving node already has another pending mes-
sage in the pending message slot for the requested memory.
P (k) = ⊥ τ 6= In k 6= n C(k) 6= Ex
Nn[(C,P )], bs |=
i→n
Ask t τ k ⇓ Nn[(C,P )], bs :
n→i
Nak t τ k
askNotInNakF
The forwarded request fails when the receiving node already released its
exclusive rights to the requested memory. Observe that the rule askNotInNakF
is for the forwarded request because of k 6= n one of its premises.
P (n) = ⊥ τ 6= In j 6= n D(j) = Ex
Nn[D][P ], bs |=
i→n
Ask t τ n ⇓ Nn[D][P ], bs :
i→j
Ask t τ n
askNotInFwd
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The receiving node forwards a request when some other node j has exclusive
rights to the requested memory, which belongs to the receiving node.
P (k) = ⊥ k 6= n C(k) = Ex
Nn[(C,P )], bs |=
i→n
Ask t Sh k ⇓ Nn[(C[k 7→ Sh], P )],
bs :
n→k
Wrb t Sh i :
n→i
Ack t Sh k 0
askShAckF
P (k) = ⊥ k 6= n C(k) = Ex
Nn[(C,P )], bs |=
i→n
Ask t Ex k ⇓ Nn[(C[k 7→ In], P )],
bs :
n→k
Wrb t In i :
n→i
Ack t Ex k 0
askExAckF
A node acknowledges a forwarded request when it has exclusive rights to the
request memory, and sends a writeback to the owner of the memory for releasing
its access rights.
P (n) = ⊥ D(n) = Ex
Nn[D][(C,P )], bs |=
i→n
Ask t Sh n ⇓ Nn[D][(C[n 7→ Sh], P )],
bs :
n→n
Wrb t Sh i :
n→i
Nak t Sh n
askShRetry
P (n) = ⊥ D(n) = Ex
Nn[D][(C,P )], bs |=
i→n
Ask t Ex n ⇓ Nn[D][(C[n 7→ In], P )],
bs :
n→n
Wrb t In i :
n→i
Nak t Ex n
askExRetry
The rules askShRetry and askExRetry fire when the receiving node has
access rights caching its own memory, and if that access right τ is of higher
precedence than the access rights it can grant the request. In such a case, the
receiving node releases its own cache rights by sending a writeback to itself, and
lets the requester retry by sending a Nak to the requesting node.
∀k.D(k) 6= Ex P (n) = ⊥
Nn[D][P ], bs |=
i→n
Ask t Sh n ⇓ Nn[D[i 7→ Sh]][P ], bs :
n→i
Ack t Sh n 0
askShAck
A node can acknowledge a shared request to its memory when no node has
exclusive access to its memory, and the requested node does have any pending
requests for its own memory. In such a case, the node acknowledges the shared
request and updates the directory entry to Sh.
∀k.D(k) 6= Ex P (n) = ⊥ −→m = {
i→j
Ask t In n | ∀j 6= i.D(j) = Sh}
Nn[D][P ], bs |=
i→n
Ask t Ex n ⇓ Nn[D[j 7→ In]∀j.D(j)=Sh[i 7→ Ex]][P ]],
bs :
n→i
Ack t Ex n |−→m| : −→m
askExAck
13
A node can acknowledge an exclusive request to its memory when no node
has exclusive cache rights to its memory and the requested node does not have
any pending requests for its own memory. In such a case, the node acknowledges
the exclusive request and updates the directory entry to Ex. In addition, the
node sends invalidation requests to all other nodes with shared cache rights to
its memory and invalidates corresponding directory entries.
2.4.2. Writeback Rules (handling writebacks).
Writeback messages are generated by either exclusive requests or shared re-
quests. A node sends a writeback when it releases the access rights for its cache
to an access rights of lower precedence: from Ex to Sh, from Ex to In, or from Sh
to In. (See askShAckF , askExAckF , askShRetry, and askExRetry in Section
2.4.1.) Ask messages for shared rights may generate sharing writebacks and Ask
messages for exclusive rights may generate invalidating writebacks.
Nn[D], bs |=
n→n
Wrb t In j ⇓ Nn[D[n 7→ In]], bs
wrbIn
Nn[D], bs |=
n→n
Wrb t Sh j ⇓ Nn[D[n 7→ Sh]], bs
wrbSh
When a writeback comes from the same node that receives the writeback, the
node Nn only needs to update the directory slot n, which is the slot for granting
the cache rights to the receiving node itself.
i 6= n
Nn[D], bs |=
i→n
Wrbt In j ⇓ Nn[D[i 7→ In, j 7→ Ex]], bs :
i→j
Ack t Ex n 0
wrbInFwd
i 6= n
Nn[D], bs |=
i→n
Wrbt Sh j ⇓ Nn[D[i 7→ Sh, j 7→ Sh]], bs
wrbShFwd
When a writeback comes from another node, which is not the receiving node,
the node Nn should update both the directory slot i, which is for the sender of the
writeback, and the directory slot j, which is the node that caused the writeback.
The wrbInFwd rule generates an Ack. We explain this Ack in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.3. Ack Rules (handling acknowledgements).
Invalidation Acks. A node waits for invalidation Acks only after receiving an
exclusive Ack with a positive invalidation pending counter, which occurs when
there are nodes with shared access rights to the requested memory. (See askExAck
in Section 2.4.1.) The node can claim its exclusive rights only after it receives all
invalidation Acks from the nodes that had shared cache to the same memory.
P (k) =
i→n
Ack t Ex k s s > 1
Nn[P ], bs |=
j→n
Ack t In k 0 ⇓ Nn[P [k 7→
i→n
Ack t Ex k (s− 1)]], bs
ackIn
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P (k) =
i→n
Ack t Ex k 1
Nn[(C,P )], bs |=
j→n
Ack t In k 0 ⇓ Nn[(C[k 7→ Ex], P [k 7→ ⊥])], bs
ackIn1
When such node receives an invalidation Ack, it decrements the pending invali-
dation counter from s to s− 1. The rule ackIn1 is for the last Ack.
Sharing Acks. On receiving a shared Ack, the node updates its cache rights to
Sh and clears the pending message slot.
P (k) =
n→i
Ask t Sh k
Nn[(C,P )], bs |=
j→n
Ack t Sh k 0 ⇓ Nn[(C[k 7→ Sh], P [k 7→ ⊥])], bs
ackSh
Exclusifying Acks. When there are no other nodes with shared access to memory
k, an Ack message with the pending invalidation counter 0 will arrive, as in the
following rules ackEx0K, ackEx0, and ackEx0F .
P (k) =
i→j
Ask t Ex k
Nn[(C,P )], bs |=
k→n
Ack t Ex k 0 ⇓ Nn[(C[k 7→ Ex], P [k 7→ ⊥])], bs
ackEx0K
P (k) =
i→j
Ask t Ex k
Nn[(C,P )], bs |=
i→n
Ack t Ex k 0 ⇓ Nn[(C[k 7→ Ex], P [k 7→ ⊥])], bs
ackEx0
If the Ack is either from k, the owner of the memory, or from i, the original
request target, the node can claim its exclusive rights immediately.
P (k) =
i′→j
Ask t Ex k i 6= k i 6= i′
Nn[(C,P )], bs |=
i→n
Ack t Ex k 0 ⇓ Nn[(C[k 7→ Ex], P [k 7→
i→j
Ask t Ex k])], bs
ackEx0F
Otherwise, if the Ack is neither from the memory owner nor from the re-
quest target, it must be the case that the request was forwarded before it was
acknowledged. Then, the node has to wait for another Ack from the memory
owner, which is generated by the rule wrbInFwd in Section 2.4.2.
When other nodes have shared access rights to k, an Ack message with the
pending invalidation counter s > 0 will arrive.
P (k) =
n→i
Ask t Ex k s > 0
Nn[(C,P )], bs |=
i→n
Ack t Ex k s ⇓ Nn[(C,P [k 7→
i→n
Ack t Ex k s])], bs
ackExAck
Then, the node should update its pending message slot with the Ack message
generated by the rule askExAck in Section 2.4.1, and wait for s invalidation
Acks to acquire exclusive rights.
2.4.4. Drop Rules (discarding outdated Acks or Naks).
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We discard Acks and Naks when no corresponding message is pending in the
RAC.
ackDropB ackDropT
P (k) = ⊥
Nn[P ], bs |=
i→n
Ack t τ k 0 ⇓ Nn[P ], bs
msgid(P (k)) 6= t
Nn[P ], bs |=
i→n
Ack t τ k 0 ⇓ Nn[P ], bs
nakDropB nakDropT
P (k) = ⊥
Nn[P ], bs |=
i→n
Nak t τ k ⇓ Nn[P ], bs
msgid(P (k)) 6= t
Nn[P ], bs |=
i→n
Nak t τ k ⇓ Nn[P ], bs
2.4.5. Retry Rules (retry on Naks).
On receiving Nak, we retry.
P (k) =
n→j
Ask t Ex k
Nn[P ], bs |=
k→n
Nak t In k ⇓ Nn[P ], bs : P (k)
nakInRetryAsk
When an invalidation request fails, we retry the exclusive request, which
caused the invalidation request. Invalidation requests are not allowed in programs
but only invoked by exclusive requests. (See askExAck in Section 2.4.1.)
P (k) =
i→n
Ack t Ex k s
Nn[P ], bs |=
k→n
Nak t In k ⇓ Nn[P ], bs :
n→i
Ask t Ex k
nakInRetryAck
msgid(P (k)) = t τ 6= In
Nn[P ], bs |=
i→n
Nak t τ k ⇓ Nn[P ], bs : P (k)
nakNotInRetry
We have two rules, nakInRetryAsk and nakInRetryAck, for the invalidation
Nak, because the pending message slot may contain not only Ask messages but
also a Ack messages while handling exclusive requests. (See ackExAck in Section
2.4.3.)
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3 Haskell Implementation
We implement the operational semantics of Section 2 in Haskell. We use this
implementation as a reference implementation to check our intuitions as we de-
velop the formal proofs of the protocol properties. We formalized the operational
semantics at the same time we implemented the protocol in Haskell. It was an it-
erative process, correcting the errors in the operational semantics by comparing
them with the implementation, and clarifying the implementation by studying
the operational semantics and rereading the original paper [LLG+90].
We implement each rule as a function in Haskell. We use the list monad to
simulate the system’s nondeterministic behavior. Our simulator takes possible
Worlds as input and computes all possible Worlds that are reachable by legal
transitions from any of the World in the input.
3.1 Data Definition
We define data types in Haskell according to the notation of Section 2.1.
data St = In | Sh | Ex deriving (Eq,Ord)
data Msg = Ask MsgID From To St About
| Ack MsgID From To St About Shares
| Nak MsgID From To St About
| Wrb MsgID From To St Because
deriving (Eq,Ord)
type From=Int; type To=Int; type About=Int
type Shares=Int
type Because=Int
type MsgID = (Int,Int)
data World = W [Node] Bus deriving (Eq,Ord,Show,Read)
data Node = N Int Dir RAC [Msg] deriving (Eq,Ord)
type Bus = [Msg]
type Dir = [St]
type RAC = (Dir,PMS)
type PMS = [Maybe Msg]
We define MsgID, the data type for message id, as a pair of integers. The first
integer is the source node, which initiated the request of that message id. The
second integer is the sequence number within the program. The information of
the source node and the sequence number within the program of the source node
ensures the uniqueness of message ids.
3.2 Implementing the Rules of the Operational Semantics
We define three functions to implement the rules of the operational semantics
in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
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recvMsg :: Node -> Bus -> (Node, Bus)
sendMsg :: Node -> Bus -> (Node, Bus)
runMsg :: Msg -> Node -> Bus -> (Node, Bus)
The functions recvMsg and sendMsg implements the communication rules
in Section 2.3. The recvMsg function corresponds to the recvMsg rule. The
sendMsg function corresponds to the sendMsg and grntMsg rules. Both func-
tions take two arguments, a node and a bus of the original World, and possibly
produce a new node state and a bus configuration if any of the corresponding
rules are applicable. When there are no corresponding rules that matches the
input, the functions just return a pair of the unchanged input arguments. Note
that the shape of these two functions are slightly different to the shape of the
communication rules. The functions take only one node as its first argument
rather than taking the entire list of nodes in the World. These functions cap-
ture the action of a particular node in the World, and examines whether it can
possibly make a transition.
The function runMsg implements the reaction rules in Section 2.4. The runMsg
function takes three arguments, and produces a new node state and a new bus
configuration. The three input arguments are the original state of the node,
original configuration of the bus, and the input message. Since sendMsg depends
on the reaction rules, the function sendMsg calls the function runMsg.
recvMsg node [] = (node, [])
recvMsg node@(N n _ _ _) bus@(b:bs)
| n /= msgTo b = (node, bus)
| otherwise = runMsg b node bs
3.3 Simulation
We use the list monad to simulate the nondeterministic system behavior. The
list monad is a common idiom that allows us to write the code that simulates
nondeterministic in the form of a deterministic sequential programming. The
program blocks after the do looks like a deterministic program but it calculates
all possible results and collects them into a list.
The function step implements zero or one transition of the World. It nonde-
terministically chooses a node of the original World, and nondeterministically
applies either of the sendMsg or recvMsg function. The function step’ imple-
ments one transition step of the World, since it excludes zero step transitions
from the result of step. The function stepM lifts step’ to apply one step tran-
sition from a set of multiple possible Worlds to the next set of possible Worlds.
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step :: World -> [World]
step (W nodelist bus) = nub $ do
node <- nodelist
cmd <- [sendMsg, recvMsg]
let (node’@(N n _ _ _), bus’) = cmd node bus
nodelist’ = update n node’ nodelist
return (W nodelist’ bus’)
step’ w = [w’ | w’ <- step w, w/=w’]
stepM :: [World] -> [World]
stepM worldlist = nub $ do w <- worldlist
case step’ w of
[] -> return w
ws -> ws
We show some sample test data simulation.
We start with a world called worldSE of two processing nodes.
Main> worldSE
W [0:II II [Nothing,Nothing] [Ask (0,1) 0 1 S 1],
1:II II [Nothing,Nothing] [Ask (1,1) 1 1 E 1]]
[]
Both processing nodes have all invalid entries in their directories (II), all in-
valid cache entries (II), and no pending messages in the pending message list
([Nothing, Nothing]). The bus is also empty ([]). Both nodes will be asking
for the same memory location. Node 0 will run the program [Ask (0,1) 0 1 S 1],
which has one request message asking for shared access rights to node 1’s mem-
ory. Node 1 will run the program [Ask (1,1) 1 1 E 1], which has one request
message asking for exclusive access rights to node 1’s memory.
We do 1 step simulation for all posible paths of nonditerminsitic choice.
Main> test 1 [worldSE]
W [0:II II [Nothing,Just (Ask (0,1) 0 1 S 1)] [],
1:II II [Nothing,Nothing] [Ask (1,1) 1 1 E 1]]
[Ask (0,1) 0 1 S 1]
W [0:II II [Nothing,Nothing] [Ask (0,1) 0 1 S 1],
1:II II [Nothing,Just (Ask (1,1) 1 1 E 1)] []]
[Ask (1,1) 1 1 E 1]
The simulation shows two possible next step from worldSE. The former shows
the world that has sent node 0’s request on the bus first. The latter shows the
world that has sent node 1’s request on the bus first. Observe the changes of the
programs, the pending message lists, and the bus from the initial state worldSE.
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There are 6 possible worlds in step 3.
Main> test 3 [worldSE]
W [0:II II [Nothing, ...
W [0:II IS [Nothing, ...
W [0:II II [Nothing, ...
W [0:II II [Nothing, ...
W [0:II II [Nothing, ...
W [0:II II [Nothing, ...
In step 11, we reach to all the final states.
Main> test 11 [worldSE]
W [0:II IS [Nothing,Nothing] [],1:SS IS [Nothing,Nothing] []] []
W [0:II II [Nothing,Nothing] [],1:IE IE [Nothing,Nothing] []] []
There are two final states: one world with both nodes having shared access rights,
and one with node 1 having the exclusive access rights.
Below is the simulation for the world worldSE of two processing nodes, both
asking for exclusive access rights to node 1’s memory.
Main> worldEE
W [0:II II [Nothing,Nothing] [Ask (0,1) 0 1 E 1],
1:II II [Nothing,Nothing] [Ask (1,1) 1 1 E 1]]
[]
Main> test 1 [worldEE]
W [0:II II [Nothing,Just (Ask (0,1) 0 1 E 1)] [],
1:II II [Nothing,Nothing] [Ask (1,1) 1 1 E 1]]
[Ask (0,1) 0 1 E 1]
W [0:II II [Nothing,Nothing] [Ask (0,1) 0 1 E 1],
1:II II [Nothing,Just (Ask (1,1) 1 1 E 1)] []]
[Ask (1,1) 1 1 E 1]
Main> test 11 [worldEE]
W [0:II IE [Nothing,Nothing] [],1:EI II [Nothing,Nothing] []] []
W [0:II II [Nothing,Nothing] [],1:IE IE [Nothing,Nothing] []] []
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4 Using Ωmega to Enforce Properties
After building an implementation in Haskell, we turned the Haskell program
into a Ωmega program in order to prove properties of the implementation.
Hindley-Milner type system To describe the properties in Ωmega, we enriched
the types that we use in the Haskell programs. Once we describe the property
using types, the Ωmega type system enforces the properties by type checking.
4.1 Static Properties on Directories
Directories have two static properties, which must hold all the time. First, a
directory can have at most one exclusive entry. Second, a directory cannot have
both exclusive entries and shared entries. Our strategy is to reflect the structure
of the directory on the type level to enforce the properties on the three primitive
directory manipulating operations: invalidate, exclusify, and share.
Consider the types of two directories that meet this property.
#[In’,In’]v : StLIST #2 #[In,In]t
#[In’,Sh’]v : StLIST #2 #[In,Sh]t
The first list #[In’,In’]v is a value that denotes a directory with two invalid en-
tries. Its type StLIST #2 #[In,In]t, indexed by the type level list #[In,In]t,
reflects the shape of the value #[In’,In’]v. The second list #[In’,Sh’]v is
a value that denotes a directory with an invalid entry and a shared entry. Its
type StLIST #2 #[In,Sh]t, indexed by the type level list #[In,Sh]t, reflects
the shape of the value #[In’,Sh’]v. Suppose we want to apply the exclusify
operation on both directories to update the first entry to Ex’ in each of the
lists. Applying exclusify on the first directory #[In’,In’]v results in a valid
directory #[Ex’,In’]v. However, applying exclusify on the second directory
#[In’,Sh’]v results in an invalid directory #[Ex’,Sh’]v. We want the exclusify
operation to be applicable to the first directory, but not the second. In general,
the exclusify operation should only be applicable to the directories of all In’s
(e.g. #[In’,In’,In’]v). We can enforce such a property by constraining the
input argument type of exclusify to be the type level lists of all Ins (e.g.
StLIST #3 #[In,In,In]t).
We define the type of the exclusify function as following to give a restriction
on the type of the input directory, and to describe the resulting directory’s type
precisely based that input directory’s type.
exclusify :: Nat’ k -> StLIST n {repl n In}
-> StLIST n {set k Ex {repl n In}}
Given a natural number k and a directory of type StLIST n {repl n In},
the exclusify function produces a new directory of type StLIST n {set k
Ex {repl n In}}. The index k indicates the entry to update in the given input
directory. The exclusify function only applies to the directories of all In’s,
because the type function application {repl n In} ranges over the type level
lists of all Ins.
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The functions repl and set, appearing in the curly braces, are type functions.
We can define functions over types just as we define functions over values. The
type function application {repl n In} replicates In n times to construct a type
level list. The type function {set k Ex l} updates the kth entry of l to Ex.
The Ωmega interpreter can reason about type functions. The normal forms of
several type function applications are illustrated below.
prompt> :n {repl #3 In} prompt> :n {set #1 Sh {repl #3 In}}
#[In,In,In]t #[In,Sh,In]t
To illustrate Ωmega’s reasoning ability, we try applying the exclusify opera-
tion to each of the two directories.
prompt> exclusify #0 #[In’,In’]v
#[Ex’,In’]v : StLIST #2 #[Ex,In]t
prompt> exclusify #0 #[In’,Sh’]v
... some messages ...
... on type checking ... => have no solution
Ωmega accepts the first one but fails to type check the second one as expected.
4.1.1. The Directory Structure
We now give the definitions in Ωmega that we used in the example above.
Data Types The following types represent the directory structure.
kind St = In | Sh | Ex
data St’:: St ~> *0 where
In’ :: St’ In
Sh’ :: St’ Sh
Ex’ :: St’ Ex
kind List a = Nil | Cons a (List a) deriving List(t)
data StLIST :: forall n . n ~> List St ~> *0 where
StNIL :: StLIST Z Nil
StCONS :: St’ st -> StLIST n l -> StLIST (S n) (Cons st l)
deriving List(v)
The types St’ and StLIST are singleton types, which have only one value for a
particular type. (e.g. In’ is the only value that has type St’ In) The deriving
List(t) clause in on the List kind definition allows us to use the list like
syntax #[In,Sh]t, which is identical to Cons In (Cons Sh Nil). The StLIST
type definition also has deriving List(v) clause as well. The StLIST type is
indexed by its legnth represented by a singleton natural number of the kind Nat
and a list of the kind List, which reflects the shape of its value. Ωmega provides
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singleton natural numbers with the kind Nat and the type Nat’, which use the
same unary notation with a zero (Z) and a successor (S) for both values and
type level objects: Z has type Nat’ Z and S Z has type Nat’(S Z). We also
have a decimal shorthand notation for the natural numbers: #0 for Z and #3 for
S(S(S Z)).
Functions We define basic functions over directories, which are singleton lists.
The functions over singleton lists, such as countEx’, use the type functions over
type lists, such as countEx in their type declarations.
countEx :: List St ~> Nat
{countEx Nil} = Z
{countEx (Cons In xs)} = {countEx xs}
{countEx (Cons Sh xs)} = {countEx xs}
{countEx (Cons Ex xs)} = S {countEx xs}
countEx’ :: StLIST n l -> Nat’ {countEx l}
countEx’ StNIL = Z
countEx’ (StCONS In’ xs) = countEx’ xs
countEx’ (StCONS Sh’ xs) = countEx’ xs
countEx’ (StCONS Ex’ xs) = S (countEx’ xs)
We can view the relationship between the functions and the type functions in
two ways. First, the type function countEx captures the property that countEx’
counts the number of exclusive entries in a directory. Second, when such type
using the type function countEx is given, the implementation of countEx’ is
a proof that there exists a way to count the number of exclusive entries in a
directory.
4.1.2. Directory Manipulating Primitives.
We define directory manipulating primitives that ensure the validity of the
directory by defining functions that have the type which precisely describes the
relationship between the inputs and the outputs. Any function definition that
type checks is a proof that the relationship hold.
Types in Ωmega are a static properties because Ωmega is a statically typed
language. So, some function can only be used in contexts where certain static
properties hold. However, some of the calling code may have to perform dynamic
checks to test whether the static properties hold. Because of this, we often have
two versions of some functions.
Static Version. We know of two ways to constrain the use of the function
statically. The first is to use type functions, such as repl and set, to con-
structively constrain the types. The second is to use static properties, such as
Equal {countEx l}, to qualify the types [Jon94]. The types of the primitive op-
erations invalidate and exclusify use type functions . The type of the prim-
itive operation exclusify uses both type functions and qualified types. Since
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these these static primitives have static constraints, the Ωmega type checker will
guard against any illegal use of these functions at compile time.
invalidate :: Nat’ k -> StLIST n l -> StLIST n {set k In l}
invalidate n = setSt’ n In’
exclusify :: Nat’ k -> StLIST n {repl n In}
-> StLIST n {set k Ex {repl n In}}
exclusify n = setSt’ n Ex’
share :: Equal {countEx l} Z => Nat’ k -> StLIST n l
-> StLIST n {set k Sh l}
share n = setSt’ n Sh’
The type of invalidate states that any StLIST is a legal input, and the
result is the same shape except that kth entry has been set to In. The type of
exclusify states that only the StLISTs that has shape constructed by {repl n In}
are legal inputs, and the result is the same shape except that kth entry has been
set to Ex. The type of share states that any StLIST whose shape has no In can
be a legal input, and the result of type StLIST n {set k Ex {repl n In}} is
the same as the input except that the kth entry has been set invalid.
Dynamic Version. We build the dynamic version of the primitives by using the
static version plus a dynamic test. We can only apply the static version of the
primitives to directories that are valid inputs. However, we often need to test
whether a given directory is valid for the function input, and then apply the
primitive function to the the test succeeds.
monad maybeM -- to use the Maybe monad
allin :: StLIST n l -> Maybe (Equal l {repl n In})
allin StNIL = return Eq
allin (StCONS Sh’ xs) = fail ""
allin (StCONS Ex’ xs) = fail ""
allin (StCONS In’ xs) = do { e@Eq <- allin xs; return Eq }
tryExclusive :: Nat’ k-> StLIST n l-> Maybe(StLIST n {set k Ex l})
tryExclusive n l = do { e@Eq <- allin l; return (exclusify n l) }
tryShare :: Nat’ k -> StLIST n l -> Maybe (StLIST n {set k Sh l})
tryShare n l = case countEx’ l of Z -> Just (share n l)
(S x) -> Nothing
The tryExclusive function builds an explicit proof object e@Eq at compile
time, which certifies that the input list contains all Ins, using the auxiliary func-
tion allin. On the other hand tryShare relies on the type checker to implicitly
build a proof. For both functions, the type checker has a proof that the static
primitives are invoked only when the inputs are valid.
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Note that the Curry-Howard correspondence on the basic list operation countEx’,
which looks trivial, is playing a key role while building the tryShare func-
tion. Because of the type of countEx’, the type checker builds a static proof
Equal {countEx l} Z for the case branch Z, which guarantees that applying
the share operation is safe when the result of the counting is zero at runtime.
Therefore, we can use the static primitive share in the case branch Z. The case
analysis on values also becomes a case analysis on types because of the Curry-
Howard correspondence. (Although it is implicit, the tryExlcusive function
also relies on a such case analysis because monadM, the Maybe monad, has case
analysis internally.) Since it is both a dynamic and static guard, Ωmega detects
the violation at compile time. This prevents accidental use of the share func-
tion in the wrong context, such as in the (S x) case branch or outside the case
expression.
The functions tryExclusive and tryShare will only apply the static primitives
when the inputs are valid. Otherwise they return the value Nothing, which
stands for failure or error. The Mabye type represents a computation that may
fail. Therefore, the protocol implementation always maintains the invariants for
directories when we use these primitives.
4.2 Approach for Liveness Properties
We have developed an approach for proving liveness properties but have not
yet completed the proof. The complete proof will be the future work. We will
singleton types for the messages and the communication channel used in the
DASH cache coherence protocol, and formulate invariants on the quantity of
messages in the system, just as we define the singleton types St’ and StLIST to
describe the static properties of directories.
We introduce the definitions and some claims we hope to prove.
Definition 1. Stable World. A World (N , bs) is stable when no node has pend-
ing requests. That is, ∀i, n ∈ [N ]. P (i) = ⊥ where N (n) = Nn[P ].
Definition 2. Valid World. A World (N , bs) is valid when all the directories
are valid and the corresponding entries of directories and RACs are coherent.
That is, ∀i, j ∈ [N ]. D(j) = C(i) where N (i) = Ni[D], N (j) = Nj [C].
Definition 3. Valid Directory. A directory is valid when it has at most one
exclusive entry, and does not have both shared entries and exclusive entries. The
validity of directories is a safety property that holds all the time. We can enforce
this kind of properties using Ωmega. (See Section 4.1.)
Claim. Progress. When w is a reachable World from a valid stable World, then
w is either a valid stable state or there exists a transition w → w′. Since w′ is also
a reachable state, we can apply the progress rule again. The progress property
states that the system always makes progress until it reaches a final valid stable
state.
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Claim. Subject Reduction: When w is a valid stable World and w →∗ w′, then
w′ is not an invalid stable World. That is, the World w′ is either a valid stable
World or an unstable World.
Claim. Correct Request Completion: When a request completes, it must com-
plete correctly so that the requesting node acquires the very access rights for the
very memory it has requested for. More formally:
Let w = (N , bs) be a reachable World from a valid stable World and Pw(i) =
m, where Pw = P such that N (n) = Nn[P ] for some i, n ∈ [N ], and m is a
message requesting for an access right τ for memory k. If w →∗ w′ such that
Pw′(i) = ⊥ and Cw′(k) = τ where N ′(n) = N ′n[(Cw′ , Pw′)] for w′ = (N ′, bs′),
and ∀w′′ between w and w′, Pw′′(i) 6= ⊥, then ∀w′′ between w and w′, Pw′′(i)
is also a message requesting for an access right τ for memory k where N ′′(n) =
N ′′n [Pw′′ ] for w
′′ = (N ′′, bs′′).
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5 Related Works
There are many studies on distributed algorithms and protocol verification. We
mention two of them, which gave us insights into our work, and we compare
them with our approach.
Murϕ is a model checker developed at Standford, where the DASH system also
originated. Norris Ip [Ip96] used Murϕ to verify several distributed algorithms
and shared memory models including the DASH cache coherence protocol. Ip
and his colleages’ work on the DASH cache coherence protocol was up to very
specific details including some optimizations such as DMA transactions. They
rediscovered errors in the protocol using Murϕ, when DMA was used carelessly.
They also worked on state reduction to verify larger systems in a reasonable
amount of time [ID93]. Their approach can only give definitive answers on fixed
size systems, while our approach provides proofs for systems of arbitrary size.
The Theory of Distributed Systems group at MIT use the Input Output Au-
tomata (IOA) to formalize distributed algorithms. They used both the model
checking approach and the theorem proving approach, and a hybrid approach
[UL06]. They are developing tools that can generate programs from the specifi-
cations as well as proving the specifications. We use a general purpose language
Ωmega to implement the programs and prove the program properties at the
same time. We hope our approach is more attractive to programmers.
6 Conclusions & Future Work
Our contributions are the following. We gave a concrete operational semantics
based on transitions, for the DASH cache coherence protocol, which did not have
a formal semantics in the original paper. We use the Ωmega type systems to
describe and prove the properties of the protocol implementation. We prove the
safety property of the system, with the help of the rich type system of Ωmega. We
are trying to apply subject reduction, which is a classical method in programming
languages, to prove liveness properties of the system. Our approach is scalable
since we prove the properties independently over the size of the system.
We are working on more complete proof on liveness properties based the op-
erational semantics. It becomes harder to compose the program that has more
precise types. But once we successfully compose the program, we have a strong
guarantee that the program has the properties represented using types. We will
refine our claims on liveness properties to make it more suitable to describe in
the Ωmega type system. Afterwards, we plan to remove the simplifications that
made our model less parallel.
27
We will be improving the quality of the Ωmega implementation as well. While
we were working on the cache coherence protocol with Ωmega, We have identified
some bugs in the Ωmega implementation, and have been trying to fix them. The
type system of Ωmega is non-decidable because of recursive type functions which
may not terminate. However, we are very sure that the type functions used in
this work are all terminating functions, since they are all primitive recursive
functions such as computing the length of a list structure.
Our next step is to polish our work based on a clear definition of what cor-
rectness means for cache coherence protocols. In this paper, we introduced some
properties that should intuitively hold without giving definition for correctness.
The correctness of cache coherence protocols are the memory models of the
multiprocessor systems. We plan to study the relation between cache coherence
protocol properties and memory models, starting with more simple protocols
in more simple multiprocessor systems such as snooping protocols in unified
memory access systems.
Our work shows how Ωmega can be used as a tool that supports theorem
proving to build proofs for practical real world problems. The theorem proving
approach has been used sparingly for system verification because there are few
tools that are easy to to learn and use. The programming pattern we used
to define directory primitives prevents typical errors that can easily occur in
program maintenance. One of the typical errors in program maintenance is trying
to use a function in the wrong context, where the assumptions for that function
do not hold. (e.g. using a binary search on an unsorted sequence.) Traditional
type systems cannot catch these kind of errors. The Ωmega type system can
check whether a certain expression is used in the right context.
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